The dialectic between invisibility and visibilities
Introduction
In this article, the media and journalism are highly relevant, but in a somewhat tangential way. While some media-related evidence will be presented and the centrality of mediation acknowledged, the main question before us is whether the very notion of hegemony in relation to neoliberalism and the capitalist values inherent to it has become so totalizing that it has reached post-hegemonic status.
This post-hegemonic status does not mean that the many available alterrealities are not able to or do not seek visibility through direct action, through the media representations of these actions and through self-mediations and networked technologies (Cammaerts, 2012) , but rather that these 'counterhegemonic' utterances of dissensus either operate from within or at the very least function to strengthen the hegemony of neoliberalism and capitalism, aiding it to reach post-hegemonic status.
If we accept that the war of position is first and foremost a mediated conflict waged at the symbolic level, but with serious material consequences, a set of observations are of particular importance when we think of the posthegemonic status of neoliberalism and the dialectic between invisibility and visibility. The first of these relates to the way in which neoliberalism as an ideology has managed to position itself as quintessentially anti-ideological, as rational and as a natural state of affairs, as invisible. The second is how the liberal media conceals its ideological bias in favour of the dominant interests in society, whilst presenting itself as objective and defending citizen interests.
The third observation relates to the alternatives to capitalism and neoliberalism, which aim to be visible, but are subsequently ridiculed, marginalized (i.e. do not reach a broad audience) and end up serving to legitimate the post-hegemonic status of neoliberalism. The final observation relates to subaltern publics -those in whose name 'democratic' decisions are legitimated and protests against these decisions staged and who are positioned in very contradictory ways, as 'citizens', as 'the 99%', and/or as 'consumers'.
Before addressing the dialectic between the invisible and the visibles in current political discourse and the role of mediation in that regard, the relationship between democracy, ideology, hegemony and discourse will be theorized.
Democracy, Ideology and Hegemony
In the field of political science, democracy tends to be defined as an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1956) . From the perspective of discourse theory, we could refer to democracy as an empty -or at the very least a floatingsignifier (cf. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) . In an interview at the University of Sussex (UK) at the end of the 1990s, Derrida (1997: 5) defined democracy as an unfulfilled promise, as a horizon of hitherto unknown possibilities; hence his notion of democracy to come -"the endless process of improvement and perfectibility, is inscribed in the concept".
The failings of liberal 'representative' democracy to deliver on its promises
When discussing the idea of democracy to come in the 1990s, Derrida was implicitly responding to claims made by Fukuyama (1992) and others that the implosion of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc represented the definitive victory of liberal representative democracy and the capitalist system it espouses over all other alternatives. However, democracy in the West has, in recent decades at least, not been this ever-receding horizon of the possible.
Democracy, it could be argued, has massively failed on its promises, it has not perfected itself, as implied by Derrida's democracy to come. It could even be agued that many of the core-promises intrinsic to democracy and to 4. democratic values, such as: 1) promoting and extending citizen participation and equality; 2) a system of citizen control from below geared towards protecting citizen interests/the collective good; and 3) the civic freedoms to dissent and to contest, enabling renewal (cf. Bobbio, 1987: 42-4) , are either in decline, been repressed or have not materialized at all.
The liberal representative model of democracy has in many Western countries been seen to protect the interests of the few first and foremost to the detriment of those of the many, regardless of which political party or coalition is in power. In this regard, Crouch (2004) argues that we live in a postdemocratic age. Liberal democracy, he claims, is merely a shell geared towards protecting capitalism and property, rather than citizen interests. This can also be linked to the crisis of liberal representative democracy, perceived to be caused by the widening gap between 'ordinary' citizens and their political representatives and the lack of symmetry between the decisions the latter make in the name of the former and the interests of the former; young people in particular are highly critical of this democratic deficit (Crozier, et al., 1975; Norris, 2011; Cammaerts, et al., 2014) .
A recent audit of the health of democracy in the UK asserted in quite dramatic terms that "representative democracy is in long-term, terminal decline" (Wilks-Heek, et al., 2012: 16-17) . The authors concluded furthermore that, "the power which large corporations and wealthy individuals now wield on the UK political system is unprecedented" (Ibid). In relation to the US similar conclusions have been drawn - Bartels (2008: 284) , for example, questions whether "democracy can flourish in the midst of great concentrated wealth", precisely because this "has pervasive and corrosive effects on political representation and policy making". Marxists would of course comment that this is not a new phenomenon, but it is certainly a debate which now also takes place from within liberal political theory. Neo-pluralists, for example, "are prepared to concede what conventional pluralists always denied, that business interests occupy a position of special importance compared with other social interests" in a democracy (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 293) .
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Linked to this is the way in which democracy is defined and used as an idea and as a practice. Arguably democracy has been reduced and constrained to liberal -and above all to representative -democracy. There are, however, many other more participatory and radical models of democracy out there (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Held, 2006) . As we defend in this special issue, democracy should be much more than the least worst 'method' to select the most apt leaders for a given demos, as implied by Churchill 1 and by those advocating a competitive elitism pitted against the tyranny of the majority (Lippmann, 1925; Schumpeter, 1942 Schumpeter, [1973 ).
Ideology and 'the real'
Ideology was coined as a concept in the wake of the French revolution, but was made popular above all by Marxist theory and the ensuing critical tradition. Using the Marxist lingo, ideology is constituted at the level of the superstructure which is determined and thus juxtaposed to the 'real' material conditions as they present themselves (Marx and Engels, 1846 [1970] : 47).
Resulting from this, it was argued, the ruling ideology aligns with the ideas and interests of the dominant elites of that era:
The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of their dominance. (ibid, 64) In Marxism, ideology is thus reduced to bourgeois ideology, geared towards legitimating the unequal and exploitative relationship between the dominant and the subordinate classes. It achieves this by producing invisibles or, to use a Hegelian concept, negations. Ideology, in other words, conceals the real or genuine social contradictions and normalizes class domination and exploitation.
This negative way of defining ideology as first and foremost bourgeois ideology, as a false consciousness-instilling device fully determined by the material conditions, has been critiqued from within as well as from outside of Marxist thinking. Neo-Marxist perspectives considerably loosened and nuanced the rigid determinism which states that the material conditions -the relations of production -define the nature of the superstructure as staunchly defended by orthodox Marxism. Besides this, ideology was also articulated in ways that went beyond class-reductionism and was inclusive of other forms of oppression relating to race, gender and sexuality (Gorz, 1980; Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1982; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) .
Neo-and Post-Marxist thinkers gave the cultural, the symbolic and thus also the ideational more agency, but still see ideology in terms of relations of domination. Althusser (1971: 109) famously referred to the Lacanian imaginary order to decouple ideology from the supposed 'real' material conditions -"Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence". The ideational and ideology itself came to be seen as having materiality too and thus able to shape the material conditions. As Bennett (1982: 51) This brings us neatly onto the Gramscian concept of hegemony as an important vehicle through which political consciousness is shaped.
From Hegemony to Post-Hegemony
By introducing hegemony, Gramsci aimed to explain the conundrum most Marxists have struggled with at some point or another, namely why do most people willingly accept their subordinate position and consent to their blatantly obvious exploitation? Gramsci (1971) quite rightly felt that this could not be explained merely by economic determinism, nor by simplistic theories of false consciousness (i.e. 'the stupidity' of the working classes) or by the repressive tactics and brutal force of the bourgeois state. This brought him to the Greek concept of the hegemon, understood as: rule by consent through the exertion of moral and intellectual leadership.
Gramsci pointed out that rule by consent was most effective if and when the domination of the dominant interests in society could be presented as mere common sense -as "the folklore of philosophy, […] always half-way between folklore properly speaking and the philosophy, science, and economics of the specialists" (ibid: 326). Gramsci (ibid, 330) contended that it is particularly when hegemony is "connected to and implicit in practical life" of ordinary people, that it is most powerful and pervasive. Common sense, furthermore, is articulated as objective truth, as rational, and thus as quintessentially antiideological; "in common sense it is the realistic, materialistic elements that predominate" (ibid: 420 -emphasis in original). This resonates with Bourdieu's (1977: 164) conception of Doxa -a situation in which "the natural and social world appears as self-evident" and inescapable or habitual to stay with Bourdieusian language.
Besides this, Gramsci (1971: 59) provided us with another conceptual tool to understand the persisting hegemonic dominance of capitalism and of dominant elites' interests, namely that of the passive revolution -"a revolution without revolution". In the face of fundamental counter-hegemonic challenges, such as financial crises (cf. 1930s), the bourgeoisie and capitalism will mutate and reconfigure with a view of safeguarding and subsequently reasserting capitalist interests. We could argue that this is also captured by Schumpeter's (1942 Schumpeter's ( [1973 ) notion of "creative destruction". Passive revolutions produce genuine change and can be the impetus for far reaching transformations, but crucially whilst at the same time protecting the fundamental interests and the ultimate hegemony of the property and capitalowning classes. In other words, hegemony is sustained by taking into account and balancing out -to some extent at least -"the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony will be exercised" (Gramsci, 1971: 161) , with a view to reassert "the control that was slipping from its grasp" (ibid: 210).
Gramsci was acutely aware that in Western Europe, where the state and civil society was much more complex and strongly embedded in the fabric of society, it would be near impossible to adopt the same rather blunt 'frontal attack' strategy as the Bolsheviks did in Russia -"a strategy and tactics altogether more complex and long-term" is required, he lamented (Gramsci, 1971: LXVI) . By using the metaphor of war, Gramsci called for a trench-war, a war of position, rather than one of manoeuvre. This war of position was to be a war in opposition to common sense and mainly situated at the level of the cultural and ideational whereby the educational system, the media and civil society should be used to construct and further a counter-hegemony to capitalism and to the liberal democratic system which sustains and legitimates it 2 .
Gramsci also acknowledged the crucial importance of language in this regard, which he defined as "a totality of determined notions and concepts and not just of words and grammatically devoid of content " (1971: 323) . This concurs with our understanding of what discourse is and does. It is not par accident that Gramsci and the interplay between hegemony and counter-hegemonies plays such a pivotal role in discourse theory to articulate a radical politics embedded within a democratic framework rather than entirely outside of it (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) .
Discourse theory, in line with Gramsci, stresses that hegemony is never total.
Common sense, Gramsci (1971: 326) stated, "is continually transforming 9.
itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered ordinary life". As a result of this, it is argued, hegemony is not a stable state. In addition to this, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 135-6) , following Derrida, argue that hegemony is constituted through and feeds off its antagonisms:
in order to speak of hegemony […] it is also necessary that the articulation should take place through a confrontation with antagonistic articulatory practices -in other words, that hegemony should emerge in a field crisscrossed by antagonisms and therefore suppose phenomena of equivalence and frontier effects.
Thus, if we were to accept that neo-liberalism has no real antagonistic ideological enemy anymore, that it has become truly 'post-hegemonic', that there is no valid constitutive outside or frontier any longer, this would at the same time imply the death of politics and of the political. Hence, the question which poses itself today, is whether there still is a genuine unterscheidung 3 when it comes to neoliberalism, capitalist interests and its alternatives in Apparatuses (Althusser, 1971) . These accounts, as Thompson (1990: 95 ) also asserts, do not do justice "to the centrality of mass communication in modern and political life". In this article I aim to elucidate the dialectic between the visible and the invisible in relation to the post-hegemonic status of neoliberalism and the role of mediation in that process. First, the way in which neoliberalism positions itself as quintessentially antiideological is explained. Second, the role of liberal mainstream media in perpetuating the post-hegemonic status of neoliberalism is discussed. Third, the way in which alternatives to neoliberalism serve to strengthen the posthegemonic status of neoliberalism is outlined to end with some thoughts regarding subaltern publics which are inherently part of the mediation process.
Neoliberalism as quintessentially anti-ideological?
Neoliberalism is understood here as a worldview that not only advocates a minimal state, but above all promotes the primacy of the free market, capitalism, property rights, and individualism in all walks of life.
Neoliberalism can be seen as an ideological project that not only aims to reduce the power of the state to intervene in or regulate economic and social life, but also champions values such as greed and individual self-interest (Friedman, 1962; Rand, 1964) . As Hallin (2008: 52) Undoubtedly, what neoliberal as an ideology has managed to achieve in the last couple of decades is quite remarkable and above all cunning. First of all, ideology was emptied of its radical, critical meaning (see discussion above) and now refers to a set of beliefs, any kind of beliefs. Secondly, neoliberalism has outfoxed Marxist theory by adopting a very similar, but reversed, perspective on ideology. Marxist perspectives define ideology as 'the Other' -i.e. bourgeois interests of capital and property -and its own solutions and conceptions of the common good are positioned as non-ideological, as relating to the 'real' material conditions. Neoliberalism in its current incarnation, I
would argue, does exactly the same. The neoliberal project positions itself as a post-narrative -as facticity, as non-negotiable and thus as quintessentially anti-ideological (Lash, 2007) , while positioning their constitutive Others as deeply ideological, as biased, as mad or nostalgic -of a by gone era.
Referring to Hegel, it could be argued that neoliberalism has managed to negate the negation of the negation. Drawing upon Hegel, Žižek (2008: 189) defines the negation of the negation as "a victory in defeat: it occurs when one's specific message is accepted as a universal framework, even by the enemy", turning a contingency into a necessity. If we accept that the first negation refers to the negation of workers' rights and their means of production by bourgeois society, the second -communist -negation then refers to the expropriation of the expropriators (Marx, 1909: 837) .
Neoliberalism represents the third negation, negating the second negation. condition is also post-hegemonic, a totality that has today become impossible to unsettle or deterritorialize?
Mainstream media in the service of post-hegemonic neoliberalism?
Arguably, one of the most important ways in which this post-hegemonic status of neoliberalism has been achieved is through news and media content production. Overall, it would be fair to say that in Western democracies, despite the advent of the internet and the emergence of notions such as citizen journalism and user generated content, the production of media content and especially its distribution are predominantly in the hands of a very limited number of private actors (Hesmondhalgh, 2002; McChesney, 2004) This high degree of horizontal -within one industry -as well as verticalacross industries -concentration in terms of media production and distribution of media content did not occur inadvertently (Freedman, 2008) .
As political economists will point out (Foster, 1986; Dal Bó, 2006) , this is the result of well-known tendencies within capitalism such as the tendency to gravitate towards monopolies or oligopolies and the capture of regulatory agencies by the interests of powerful actors in the industry which they need to regulate. Given the fact that media and communication have always been highly regulated sectors, the concentration of media ownership is something that has been encouraged by political elites who often align themselves with the interests of the owners of these media conglomerates. Media owners have also consistently yielded their resource power with a view to resist, avoid or 13.
reduce regulation, especially when it comes to cross-ownership, but also advertising (Street, 2001) .
From a critical and normative perspective, the existence or rather perseverance of such "monopolies of knowledge", as Innis (1951) The corporate domination of both the media system and the policy-making process that establishes and sustains it causes serious problems for a functioning democracy and a healthy culture. Media are not the only factor in explaining the woeful state of our democracy, but they are a key factor.
In addition to this, as already alluded to earlier, the media is the prime vehicle through which other products and services are marketed to an audience that is mostly positioned as a consumer, not as a democratic public or a demos (Thompson, 1990: 178) .
All this inevitably has an impact on the media and news content that is produced by these media and communication conglomerates. For example, contrary to the traditional watchdog role ascribed to journalism by the liberal normative model, "[p]owerful global forces, most notably the global financial markets and transnational business corporations," are rarely scrutinized nor held to account by the liberal mainstream media (Curran, 2005: 138) . Recent research into the way journalists and the media organisations they represent, reported on economic and financial matters, both pre-as well as post-2008 financial crisis is illustrative of this (Berry, 2012; Manning, 2012) . The specialized "financial media did not act as our antennae and they did not warn us", Manning (2012: 187) concludes; even worse, in the aftermath of the 2008 crash, they consciously choose "not to vigorously investigate and report the information that was emerging from within the financial systems around the world" so as not to jeopardize the capitalist system they serve. As will be outlined below, bias can also be observed when it comes to the representation of systemic contestation to and alternatives of capitalism.
Given all this, it is not surprising that many, both from within and from outside the liberal paradigm, argue that rich and affluent elites in conjunction with the 'corporate community' have a disproportionate influence on democracy and on the media sphere (Mann, 1986; Crouch, 2004; McChesney, 2004; Domhoff, 2013) .
The alternatives as constitutive of neoliberal post-hegemony?
It is often said that 'there is no alternative' to capitalism and neoliberal values 7 . However, there are of course plenty of alternatives to capitalist modes of production and exchange: different choices can be made in terms of distributing land, property and wealth nationally and internationally; or different models and modes of exchange could be promoted; regulation could be much more stringent and more public interest oriented, etc. In other words, yes, there are plenty of alternatives, but none of them are deemed to be realistic within the parameters of the values inherent to neoliberalism -which I will call here 'the inside'. However, at the same time, it could also be argued that the post-hegemonic status of neoliberalism requires 'constitutive outsides', i.e. its alternatives, to be somewhat visible with a view to labeling them as ideological; and thus unreasonable, irrational and radical.
While from a normative perspective, the democratic role of the media is to be "responsive to the demands of civil society" (Curran, 2005: 138) , it is often argued that media organisations and journalists are negatively biased against those that dissent in a democracy, especially when it concerns systemic contestations of capitalist interests. This is apparent in the way in which industrial conflicts and trade unions or anti-capitalist protesters have been portrayed in the UK media, for example (Glasgow Media Group, 1976 Donson, et al., 2004; McCurdy, 2012 structures which protect these interests, are granted visibility, but usually in a negative way by adopting a derisory inferential tone or by inducing moral panics.
It would, however, be wrong to treat 'the media' and journalists that work within media organisations in an essentialist manner and to consider them all to be docile servants of capitalist interests and the power elite, as some of the Marxist as well as neo-pluralist accounts of mainstream media seem to suggest. Arguably a more nuanced and complex perspective is needed in order to make sense of the intricacies of the relationship between ideology, capitalism, and mainstream media in a liberal democracy.
We could refer here to Bourdieu (1998) who spoke of a degree of field autonomy for journalism, which is by no means absolute -i.e. the journalism field is impacted by other arguably more powerful fields, but neither is some degree of autonomy totally absent. For sure, dominant neoliberal ideology is eagerly reproduced and disseminated through and by liberal mainstream media (Phelan, 2007) , but -in line with a Foucauldian approach -resistance to this prevalent tendency can be observed at times as well, even from within the mainstream. Journalists have to navigate and negotiate many different roles and reach an increasingly fragmented number of constituencies. They are expected to be independent and critical, but at the same time they are political beings and employees of media organisations with distinct editorial lines (Carpentier, 2005) . Furthermore, oppositional culture is not entirely stifled in mainstream media. Systemic critiques of capitalism are not completely absent in the mainstream media, but even on a 'public service' broadcaster such as the BBC, "[antisystemic] accounts tend to appear relatively rarely and/or at the margins of coverage" (Berry, 2012: 268) . At the same time, I argue that the enduring presence of (some) anti-systemic voices in the mainstream media is above all instrumental to the preservation of the post-hegemonic status of neoliberalism as quintessentially anti-ideological.
I concur here with Miliband Sr. (1969: 64) who argued that "a monopoly of the means of communication, or the prohibition of expression of all alternative views and opinions" is not necessary to control "the economic and political systems of advanced capitalism". Indeed, as Miliband pointed out several decades ago, the control of economic and politics systems by capitalist interests "may well be better served without such a monopoly", especially as liberty and freedom are the core-values of liberalism. The lack of such a monopoly is thus essential in order to preserve the discursive integrity of neoliberalism and is not really an issue as long as the majority of media organisations exert symbolic and ideological control in favour of the interests of the few. As such, Miliband's words still ring true when he asserted that the press may well claim to be independent and to fulfill an important watchdog function. What the claim overlooks, however, is the very large fact that it is the Left at which the watchdogs generally bark with most ferocity, and what they are above all protecting is the status quo. (ibid: 199 -emphasis in original)
Of course, activists and social movements that challenge neoliberalism and capitalist modes of production and exchange are not only dependent on mainstream media resonance to gain visibility, they have always used other media and communication technologies that are at their disposal to communicate movement frames independently; and this is certainly the case in today's information society.
Pamphlets, satirical prints, letters, flyers, stickers, buttons, posters, radio, cassettes, video, TV and more recently the internet have all at some point been appropriated into the self-mediation toolbox of activists and social movements (cf. Fanon, 1965; Darnton, 1982; Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, 1994; Downing, et al. 2001; Cammaerts, et al., 2013) . Such communicative technologies in the hands of activists serve to disseminate movement frames, but also to construct a positive self-image of the movement, celebrating and thereby self-affirming collective identities and gain respect and support 'from below' (Fraser, 2000: 221) The main issue in relation to the use of (alternative) movement media remains, however, that they tend to reach micro-rather than mass-audiences and in addition to this, those that are reached through movement media are more likely to be those that are already aligned with the movement's frames, impeding resonance beyond the likeminded (Rucht, 2013) . This also brings us to the question of audiences, to the publics in whose name politicians rule and protesters advocate.
The subaltern publics who dare not speak?
If we accept the premise that the post-hegemonic war of position is mainly a mediated war shaped by the dialectic between struggles of invisibility and visibility, it is not enough to only consider the production of symbolic meaning by political and media elites or by activists; we need to include the audience or rather publics as well, i.e. those whom producers of meaning aim to reach and above all influence. Mediation, as Silverstone (2006: 42) Regarding the former, we could refer to the original cover of Guy Debord's Society of the Spectacle book (1967). The image was comprised of an audience wearing spectacles, all staring at what we can assume is an early 3D-projection. The image exhumes an uncomfortable uniformity; without exception all the subjects in the picture are utterly transfixed by the spectacle, nobody resists, no one dissents -they are willing victims of 'the permanent opium war' (Debord, 1967: #44) . This is reminiscent of the way in which members of the Frankfurter Schule, but also Herman and Chomsky (1988) , approach the audience; as the subordinate masses, bereft of agency and uncritically swallowing the imperialist and capitalist propaganda that is being fed to them on a daily basis. Also in some liberal accounts we can witness a rather negative inflection towards the masses tied to the classic liberal fear of the tyranny of the majority and of mob rule by "the bewildered herd", to refer to Walter Lippmann (1925) .
From the 1980s onward, the cultural studies tradition has quite rightly critiqued this culturally pessimistic account of the passive audience. From a culturalist perspective, the audience is attributed much more agency, it is varied and segmented; some accepting and others actively resisting mainstream representations (Hall, 1997) . Proponents of a cultural studies approach nuanced the rigid domination model by stressing the polysemic nature of media production and emphasizing the importance of potential differences in social positions and contexts between those encoding and those decoding meaning, thereby also opening up a space for negotiation or rejection of meaning. This in combination with cognitive approaches has given rise to notions such as the active audience or even the user of technology, both implying less passive actors (Livingstone, 2013) .
However, as argued above, the resistant ideological readings are integral to and become intrinsically constitutive of the dominant preferred ideological reading, which aims to remain hidden, thereby confirming its post-hegemonic status, obscuring inherent conflict. This entrenched war of position between the dominant reading, which presents itself as invisible and alternative readings which adopt strategies of "monstration" (Dayan, 2013) , becomes highly problematic if we bring the notion of audiences as publics into the fray.
Despite their various struggles for visibility, the constitutive outsides of neoliberalism are not considered desirable in liberal democracies by large parts of its populations. This inevitably brings us back to the notion of false consciousness. As argued above, false consciousness comes with a lot of historical baggage, but Lukes (2005: 149 -emphasis in original) made an attempt to save it:
[unwelcome historical baggage] can be removed if one understands [false consciousness] to refer, not to the arrogant assertion of a privileged access to truths presumed unavailable to others, but rather to a cognitive power of considerable significance and scope namely, the power to mislead.
Lukes acknowledges that false consciousness, understood like this, is never absolute or total. Indeed, many might be perfectly aware of their subordinate position and frustrated about their macro-and micro-exploitation but without therefore wanting or feeling it necessary to do anything about it. As Lukes (2005: 150 -emphasis in original) contends, echoing Foucault to some extent, "one can consent to power and resent the mode of its exercise". This last point could be related to the very high levels of anger and frustration towards democratic politics and the media by large parts of the population in Western democracies. In 2013, two thirds of EU citizens did not to trust their national parliament (68%) or government (71%) 10 . When it comes to media similar degrees of distrust can be found; on average 60% of European citizens do not trust their press 11 .
Approaching the audience as a Spivakean (rather than a Gramscian) subaltern might be fruitful in this regard. Spivak (1988) precisely reacted against those that pretended to know the 'true' interests and consciousness of the subaltern and claim to speak in its name. The subaltern, Spivak argued, is not homogenous, but rather a divided heterogeneous incoherent entity without a common will, but at the same time a principle of resistance, potentially disruptive and an always present threat to dominant elites, but it is silent too; it ceases to be subaltern (and arguably ceases to be audience) when it dares to speak (Spivak, 1988) .
The reality of this threat can be witnessed in the way in which some capitalist elites are starting to see the increased inequalities in Western democracies as a danger to the status quo. The focus on inequality as a global risk by the most recent World Economic Forum (WEF, 2014) and a recent speech by IMF director Christine Lagarde (2014) warning against the dangers of inequality and ensuing political instability attest to this.
Concluding Thoughts
The post-hegemonic war of position is approached here mainly as a mediated It is, however, also too simplistic to assume that those who are on the receiving end of this post-hegemonic war of position between invisibility and visibility are somehow drugged by media spectacles to such an extent that they cannot see their own 'real' material interests anymore or only consider self-interest rather than cultivate a sense of community and collectivity. The anger and frustration felt by subaltern publics, young and old, in many European democracies is vigorous but subdued at the same time, it is directed at economic, political and media elites alike, but just like the Spivakean subaltern it dare not speak.
This discontented subaltern should be mobilized to foster collective solutions and communality, as argued for among others by Gilbert (2013) . In the context of the argument developed in this article, we could refer to the need for more democratic control and oversight, for more genuine pluralism in media and public discourse, and to advocate for an unapologetic renewed politics of redistribution. In order to achieve this, a new 'democracy to come', a new democratic imaginary deterritorialised from the market imaginary, is needed, as also called for by Gramsci in the 1910s. An entirely new state apparatus needs to be constructed, Gramsci (1977: 133) argued, "which internally will function democratically, i.e. will guarantee freedom to all anticapitalist tendencies and offer them the possibility of forming a proletarian government".
The question remains, however, to which extent this is possible given the posthegemonic era we live in whereby the struggles for visibility of such rearticulations have become inherently constitutive of the strategies of invisibilisation by neoliberalism and capitalist interests and the subalternaudiences, democratic publics, the 99% -are not ready or in a position to give their support for any of the constitutive outsides.
